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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000212

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PREL RS RO NATO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA PROPOSES "INTEGRATED APPROACH" FOR BLACK
SEA REGION SECURITY COOPERATION

REF: A. A) 04 STATE 253728

¶B. B) 04 BUCHAREST 2700
¶C. C) 04 BUCHAREST 1832

Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS 1.4
 A, B, AND D

¶1. (C) Summary. Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry
officials met with Embassy officers January 19 to discuss the
GOR's proposals for an "integrated approach for security
cooperation in the Black Sea region." Romania envisages an
expanded NATO role in the region and mirrors its proposed
strategy for maritime security on the "four pillar" approach
under discussion at USEUCOM. At the same time, the GOR
counts on the U.S. to convince Turkey to "go along" with
Romania's ideas. Romania will host a meeting with Turkey and
Bulgaria January 24 to discuss possible joint strategies for
Black Sea security. The GOR would also like a meeting
between GOR and US officials in Washington, possibly in
March, to discuss Black Sea issues. End Summary.

Seeking an "Integrated Approach" to Black Sea Security
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¶2. (C) MFA Director General of the Strategic Policies
Directorate Cristian Istrate, MFA NATO Division Director
Mirela Maghiar and two MOD representatives met with PolChief,
Naval Attache and PolMilOff January 19 to discuss the GOR's
views on enhancing security in the Black Sea region. Istrate
began the discussion by remarking that President Traian
Basescu emphasized in a January 18 speech (septel) the
importance of the Black Sea region. Istrate stressed that
the GOR seeks to help develop an "integrated approach to
security in the Black Sea region" which will encompass "as
much Western involvement as possible...with NATO and the EU
taking a more prominent profile in the region."

"Three Dimensions"

¶3. (C) Istrate delivered an outline titled "A Basis for an
Integrated Approach for Security Cooperation in the Black Sea
Region. Building Synergy Among Various Initiatives," which
the Romanians classified as confidential. Using the outline
as a template for discussion, Istrate underscored that the
GOR seeks U.S. input and feedback on how best to develop an
integrated security approach in the Black Sea region. The
GOR proposes an "integrated approach" that focuses on three
"dimensions" in the following sequence: the "political
dimension," the "operational dimension," and "security sector
reform." Istrate said that the paper had been approved "at
the highest levels" in the new Romanian government and would
also be shared by Romanian ambassadors with U.S.
interlocutors in Washington and at USNATO. Istrate
emphasized that the paper represented "only the security"
angle of the new government's emerging approach towards the
Black Sea, which would "also address political and economic
angles." Post will transmit the full text of the paper to
Department, DOD, and USNATO septel.

"Four Pillars" and "Three Allies"

¶4. (C) The operational dimension - the area to which the
outline devotes the most attention - comprises four focal
points that mirror USEUCOM's discussions of a possible "four
pillar" approach to the Black Sea: "maritime security," "land
and air security," "border defense," and "civil emergency
planning." Within the rubric of "maritime security," the GOR
proposes the establishment of a "Black Sea Task Force"
comprising "three allies," Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.
Istrate stated that Turkey and Bulgaria had been invited to
participate in a meeting in Bucharest January 14 to discuss
possible task force cooperation in connection with NATO
command and information exchange structures. Turkey was
unable to participate in the meeting because severe fog
January 14 prevented the Turks from arriving in Bucharest;
the meeting has been rescheduled for January 24.

¶5. (C) Addressing expected Turkish reticence to participate
fully in the proposed Black Sea Task Force, Istrate stated
that U.S. "encouragement" of Turkey could overcome their
objections, opining that the "Turks do not want to be
perceived as opposing NATO's role in the Black Sea." Istrate
continued that the Turk's "cautious approach" reflects their

desire to not "upset" Russia or "create stress with France
and Germany."

¶6. (C) In addition to creation of a Black Sea Task Force to
increase maritime security, the GOR's outline also proposes a
heightened role for NATO in the region, including
"information exchange and command support for the Black Sea
Task Force" and joint patrolling in the Black Sea. The
outline envisages a relatively limited role for BLACKSEAFOR
"in preventing terrorism and WMD trafficking through the
scope of the current agreement."

¶7. (C) Under the "pillar" of land and air security, the GOR
proposes the establishment of a "Joint Interagency Task
Force" (JIATF) modeled on the USG's JIATF. The JIATF would
integrate law enforcement, customs and defense assets from
participating states. The GOR's proposed border defense
"pillar" envisages using the "Border Defense Initiative" (the
"Black Sea Border Security Initiative" (BSBSI)) proposed by
the GOR (Ref C). The "pillar" dealing with civil emergency
planning proposes establishment of "common procedures and
mechanisms of civil emergency planning."

Political and Security Sector Dimensions

¶8. (C) The GOR characterizes the "political dimension" as an
area in which NATO can and should play a central role.
Romania's specific proposals include "enhancing political
debates in NATO on the security situation in the region" and
establishment of a "Black Sea caucus" to build NATO awareness
of and interest in the Black Sea region. Under the rubric of
"security sector reform," the GOR proposes "full use" of
Partnership for Peace (PfP) instruments. The GOR's suggested
strategies include "providing assistance" to Black Sea
partners that have launched or plan to launch Individual NATO
Partnership Action Plans and encouraging Moldova to develop
an Individual Partnership Action Plan.   According to
Istrate, the GOR would like to see Moldova move closer to
NATO.

Romania Will "Resist Temptation" to Expand BLACKSEAFOR
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¶9. (C) When pressed for details about the relation, if not
potential overlap, between Romania's proposed "integrated
approach" and BLACKSEAFOR, Istrate acknowledged that both
BLACKSEAFOR and Romania's Black Sea Border Security
Initiative (BSBSI) could play a role in "preventing terrorism
and WMD." In the GOR's view, BLACKSEAFOR must "stay within
its limits" although an "anti-terrorism aspect, such as
information exchange," detecting and monitoring could be
appropriate. He stressed, however, that the BSBSI would, by
definition, address law enforcement issues whereas
BLACKSEAFOR has a different principle focus e.g. search and
rescue, humanitarian operations. Istrate stated that Turkey
seeks the extension of BLACKSEAFOR to include "constabulary"
functions, notably "detection and monitoring" aimed at
fighting terrorism and the establishment of a BLACKSEAFOR
"permanent command center." Istrate opined that
significantly extending BLACKSEAFOR's role would be "against
the letter and spirit of BLACKSEAFOR." Pausing for a moment,
Istrate insisted that Romania "will resist the temptation to
turn BLACKSEAFOR into a regional military alliance," which he
characterized as NATO's role.

¶10. (C) When asked for details about the status of the BSBSI,
Istrate conceded that Romania has made little progress toward
organizing the project and moving beyond the political stage.
 Istrate stated that the GOR's goal is to "continue to
operationalize" the BSBI, but acknowledged that little has
been done in this regard since the November 5 meeting at the
State Department among Romanian Ambassador Ducaru, State and
DOD officials in which USG interlocutors urged the GOR to
effectively organize and staff the BSBSI (Ref C).

A March Meeting in Washington?

¶11. (C) Istrate emphasized that the GOR understands the
importance of the cooperation of NATO allies in the Black Sea
region, but underscored again that Romania would like the
U.S. to encourage Turkey to cooperate fully in developing a
joint NATO strategy. He stated that the GOR would welcome
continuing dialogue with the U.S. on Black Sea issues and
promised to provide Embassy a readout of the January 24
Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania meeting in Bucharest. Istrate
suggested a meeting between and USG and GOR interlocutors at
the office director or DAS level in Washington, possibly in
mid-March, to discuss development of a joint strategy in the
Black Sea region. PolChief promised to stay in touch with
Istrate regarding possible scheduling of such a meeting.

¶12. (C) Comment. President Basescu's recent public
discussion of the centrality of the Black Sea region to
Romania's foreign policy priorities (Septel) may reflect
increased high-level attention to the region. Nonetheless,
the GOR has consistently sought U.S. guidance on Black Sea
issues and told us that it favors an expansion of NATO's

role in the region (Refs A and B). We anticipate that
Romania will continue to consult closely with us regarding
its proposals for the region. Indeed, its proposed
implementation of a "four pillar" approach reflects
discussion points raised by Embassy officers during a meeting
with MFA officials last fall. The GOR recognizes that its
proposals will have little weight with Turkey (or other
littoral states) without U.S. backing. Although we welcome
the GOR's enthusiasm for enhancing security in the Black Sea,
we note that Romania has apparently yet to follow through on
its proposed BSBSI, despite strong urging last fall from USG
interlocutors to move the BSBSI from the conceptual to
operational phase (Ref C). End Comment.

¶13. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
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